This paper addresses the omitted variable problem in time series studies of individual capital gains realizations. While not directly identifying the omitted variables, I use the realizations of corporate capital gains to test for common omitted variables. Jointly estimating individual and corporate realizations provides more efficient estimates than traditional single-equation models. The results provide empirical support for omitted variables being important in time series models. In both single-equation or multi-equation models controlling for omitted variables greatly reduces the estimated elasticities of individual and corporate capital gains.
Introduction
Estimates of the sensitivity of capital gains realizations to changes in tax rates are central to the design and analysis of capital gains tax policy. The primary focus of empirical work in this area has been to obtain estimates of the elasticity of capital gains realizations with respect to changes in the tax rate, with the goal of obtaining better estimates of any revenue loss or gain in response to policy changes.
1 This paper extends the literature on individual capital gains realizations by implementing a simple model to allow for the effects of potentially omitted variables in time series equations. I jointly estimate contemporaneous capital gains realizations of individuals and corporations and find elasticities that are significantly lower than previously estimated. The results confirm prior authors' concerns that omitted variables are an important factor in empirical models of capital gains realizations. The primary effect of omitted variables is to bias the coefficient on the tax rate upwards, leading to an overestimate of the realizations elasticity. Corrected estimates of realization elasticities for individuals are 12.5 to 37.5 percent lower than previously reported in the literature.
The next section of the paper briefly reviews the empirical literature on individual capital gains realizations and introduces the significance and pattern of capital gains realizations by corporations. The third section presents a replication of prior empirical results and extends the analysis to the corporate sector. The fourth section presents a simple approach to address omitted variable bias and presents the key results of the paper. The conclusion provides a brief summary and suggests additional research.
Capital Gains Realizations and Changes in Tax Policy
The literature on capital gains is extensive, and itself has been subject to extensive reviews. 2 Almost exclusively, this research has focused on realizations by individuals, with the Tax Reform Act of 1986 (TRA86) providing a discrete change in tax policy when it eliminated the preferential tax rate for long-term capital gains. Empirical research on realization behavior has utilized two types of data: cross-sectional and time series. This paper focuses on capital gains elasticities obtained from time series equations, most recently updated and analyzed by Eichner and Sinai (2001) . However, in both cross-sectional and time series settings, conclusions have been tempered by concerns over economic variables that may have been omitted from reduced-form equations of realization behavior.
While substantial empirical work has been devoted to the realization behavior of individuals, corporate capital gains have been essentially ignored in the literature even though they account for both a significant amount of activity and been the subject of legislative interest. and show a sharp spike in realizations in 1986, coincident with the changes brought about by the TRA86. Both series also display a decline in the amount of realizations following 1986, followed by increasing realizations during the 1990s. Statistically, the two series are highly correlated, with a Pearson correlation of 0.97.
Despite similarities in realization patterns, the capital gains rate applicable to each has varied dramatically. Similar to the taxation of individual capital gains, corporate capital gains have also been subject to varying preferences. Prior to the TRA86, which eliminated the preferential capital gains rates for both individuals and corporations, corporations were provided with an alternate rate at which capital gains could be taxed. Corporations calculated their total tax liability two ways: first, with capital gains income counted as ordinary income subject to the ordinary rate, and second, with capital gains income taxed at the alternate rate. Corporations were liable for whichever amount was less. For corporations with total taxable income in the lower brackets, the ordinary rate could well be preferable to the alternate rate. Prior to the passage of TRA86, the 28 percent alternate rate was less than the statutory rate for any corporation with taxable income in excess of $50,000, at which point the regular rate was 30 percent. The maximum corporate rate of 46 percent applied to income in excess of $100,000. 5 By contrast, prior to TRA86 when the preference was eliminated, individuals were provided an exclusion for 60 percent of their net long-term capital gains. The effect of such an exclusion was to reduce the effective tax rate on capital gains income regardless of the rate of tax on ordinary income.
Beginning in 1990 a series of tax law changes instituted a maximum rate for individuals. Sinai (2000) in column 1. While minor differences appear in the coefficient estimates, none are statistically distinguishable across the two sets of estimates. 7 In particular, the elasticity of the realizations to the capital gains rate, estimated at the sample means, is essentially identical.
Omitted variables will affect the estimation results if the omitted variables are correlated with variables included in the regression. In particular, the omission of relevant variables will
bias the estimated coefficients of the regression and increase their standard errors. 8 Given both
the similarity in factors that should affect realizations, and the lack of a structural model for individual behavior, one approach to addressing omitted variables is to include total corporate realizations as an additional explanatory variable in equation (1). This result is presented in the third column of have not been previously reported in the literature, I estimate equation (2) using each set of realization data given in Table A1 .
Results of the OLS estimations of equation (2) are reported in Table 2 . For total net longterm corporate realizations the estimated coefficient on the tax rate variable is negative, and significant, and yields an estimated elasticity of -2.62. This estimated elasticity suggests overall corporate realizations are extremely sensitive to tax rates, and more than three times as sensitive than the OLS estimates for individuals presented in the first two columns of Table 1 . In the second column, equation (2) is re-estimated for corporate realizations taxed at the alternate rate.
Again, the coefficient on the tax rate is negative and significant, but the magnitude is only onethird that for all corporate realizations, with an implied elasticity of realizations of -0.90. In the last column, equation (3) is estimated for realizations taxed at the alternate rate of firms with net income. In contrast to the first two specifications the tax coefficient is not statistically significant.
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While the results of Table 2 provide point estimates of capital gains elasticities for corporations, these time series OLS results are potentially subject to the same criticisms as the individual realizations reported in Table 1 . In particular, the reduced form equation of corporate realizations is likely subject to the same omitted variable bias as individual realizations.
Joint Estimation of Individual and Corporate Realizations
While both equations (1) and (2) are potentially subject to omitted variables, it is likely any omitted variable will affect both equations. In such a setting, the error terms from each equation will be correlated, and joint estimation of a seemingly unrelated regression model can lead to more efficient parameter estimates.
12 Table 3 reports the results of jointly estimating equations (1) and (2). The system of equations is estimated three times, once for each definition of corporate capital gains realizations estimated in Table 2 . Examining the estimated coefficients for the tax rates, the first row shows all of the coefficients for the individuals capital gains tax rate to be lower than the point estimate of -4.08 reported in Table 1 , implying a capital gains elasticity for individuals of -0.54 t0 -0.70, or 12.5 percent to 37.5 percent lower than obtained from the single equation models. For corporate capital gains, only one of the three coefficients is statistically significant (system 1, for all netlong term corporate realizations), but the estimated elasticity is only 57 percent of the elasticity estimated in Table 2 . The coefficients on the corporate capital gains rate for systems 2 and 3 become positive, and are not statistically significant. Overall, the result of Table 3 suggest that relevant variables have been omitted from standard time series estimation of capital gains realizations, leading to over-estimates of individual capital gains tax elasticities.
It is worth noting that estimating the equations in a system does not have as dramatic an effect on the other variables in the regressions. The log GNP deflator, which was insignificant in Table 1 for individuals and in each of the specifications in Table 2 for corporations remains insignificant in each of the systems. The coefficient on the real value of household equity included in the individual realizations equations remains significant but decreases slightly from the estimate in Table 1 , as do the coefficients on the level of the S&P in the corporate realizations equations , which decrease relative to Table 2 in systems 1 and 3 but increases in system 2. Similarly, the coefficients on the log of real GNP remain insignificant for individuals and significant for corporations. Overall, it appears that omitted variables primarily affect the estimate of the responsiveness to tax rates, and none of the other economic variables.
Conclusions
In this paper I jointly examine the realization behavior of individuals and corporations to address the issue of omitted variables in time series studies of capital gains behavior. The empirical results confirm prior suspicions that important variables are omitted from these specifications, causing estimated capital gains elasticities to be biased upward. By jointly estimating individual and corporate realizations to mitigate the effects of common omitted variables, I estimate individual capital gains elasticities to be 12.5 percent to 37.5 percent lower than estimated in single equation models.
While demonstrating the statistical effect of omited variables, this paper does not attempt to provide a list of potential candidates to be included in realizations equations. However, the high degree of correlation between individual and corporate realizations, combined with the relatively low correlation in the underlying tax rates, suggests that broader economic factors are influencing both series. Eichner and Sinai (2000) 14 While time series data on realizations by tax-exempt entities might be able to serve as a proxy for other (omitted) economic factors, there are insufficient disclosures by these entities to create a long time series at this time. CREF, for example, did not provide this data prior to 1985. As a result, such tests will have to await the release of additional years of data.
1.
Realization elasticities are not the only aspect of capital gains of interest, but they have received a disproportionate amount of attention. Other concerns include the distributional consequences of capital gains, the efficiency of capital gains taxation, the effects on risktaking and the effects on asset prices. However, even these topics will depend, at least indirectly, on the extent to which realizations respond to capital gains tax rates.
2.
A particularly thorough review is provided by Burman (1999) . See also Auerbach (1988 Auerbach ( , 1989 , Auerbach and Slemrod (1997) , and Gravelle (1994) . Miller and Ozanne (2000) provide an overview of the capital gains forecasting methodology used by the Congressional Budget Office.
3. In addition to securities sales, which are typical of the types of realizations estimated, corporate capital gains also include gains reported in part I of the 4797 "Gains and Losses From Sales or Exchanges of Assets Used in a Trade or Business and Involuntary Conversions." Assets included in this category are §1231 property used in trade or business (including timber and livestock), §1245 gains from dispositions of certain depreciable property, §1250 gains from dispositions of certain depreciable realty, §1252 gains from dispositions of farm land, §1254 gains from dispositions of interest in oil, gas, geothermal, or other mineral property and §1255 gains from dispositions of §126 property (cost sharing payments under several government programs). McDonald and Plesko (1989) argue that Part I gains are less responsive to tax rate changes than other gains. They report that between 1983 and 1986 "part I" gains accounted for 68 percent of total capital gains in 1983, declining to 38 percent in 1985 and 24 percent in 1986. The 1986 percentage is the smallest even though part I gains were the highest of the four years, at $11.64 billion.
4.
Individual realization data are taken from Eichner and Sinai (2000) . Corporate data here and throughout the paper are drawn from various years of the IRS Statistics of Income Corporation Source Book (Publication 1053).
5.
Even though corporate capital gain and ordinary income are taxed at the same rate, the distinction between capital and ordinary income remains important since corporate capital losses are only permitted as a deduction against capital gains. Unused capital losses can be carried back three years or forward five years.
6. See Burman (1999) chapter 2 for a history.
7.
A National Income and Products Account revision took place since their paper was published, affecting the values of real GNP, the GNP deflator, and the first difference in real GNP.
8. See Greene (2000) chapter 8 for a discussion of omitted variables.
9.
Indirectly, one might argue that corporate capital gains lead to greater corporate profits that increase the value of firms' capital assets. However, capital gains are no different Notes than any other factor that increases the value of a firm, and their realization, to the extent that it triggers a corporate level tax, could actually decrease the value of the firm. Further, depending on the classification of the security for financial reporting purposes (trading or available-for-sale) the financial reporting will include the value of accrued, but unrealized, capital gains and losses in net income or shareholder's equity.
10.
In all cases, realizations by pass-through entities (e.g. subchapter S, regulated investment companies and real estate investment trusts) are excluded as they are taxed directly to the individual.
11. The three columns in Table 2 have different sample sizes; the magnitude and significance of the tax rate coefficients in columns (1) and (3) are unchanged if the sample is restricted to the same years as column (2).
12.
See Greene (2000) , chapter 15, for a description of the SUR model, along with the feasible generalized least squares estimate of Zellner's (1962) .
13.
See Neubig and Sullivan (1987) .
14.
The reader is referred to Greene (2000) chapter 9 for further information. Table 1 Individual Capital Gains Realizations, 1955 -1997 (standard errors in parentheses) Eichner & Sinai (2001) Individual realizations and tax rates are taken from Eichner and Sinai (2000) .
